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1 Introduction 
In July 1988 the Basle Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices 
published its risk-based capital standard (Basle Accord), which took effect in the G-10 countries 
at the end of 1992. Since then, banks are obliged to hold a minimum regulatory capital ratio of 8 
percent of all risk-weighted assets. According to the capital buffer theory, banks try to maintain a 
certain buffer of regulatory capital above the regulatory minimum. As a consequence, portfolio 
risk and regulatory capital are expected to be positively related. Banks increase capital when 
increasing portfolio risk and vice versa in order to maintain their capital buffer.  
Indeed, evidence from the US banking sector by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro 
(1997) and Aggarwal and Jaques (1998) as well as by Rime (2001) from Switzerland seems to 
confirm this positive relationship. Heid et al. (2004) focusing on German savings banks, 
however, only find meagre evidence, indicating that the results for Germany may differ. So far, 
evidence of the whole German banking system does not exist. However, the German banking 
system, in particular, may be of special interest. In an international context, German banks are 
less profitable and less capitalised than banks in most other countries. According to a long-
lasting debate, this is partly attributed to the unique tripartite German banking system of public 
savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks, that fosters competition among these banking 
groups. Indeed, the four largest private banks in Germany still have a market share of below 20 
percent, if measured by total assets. As a consequence, banking regulation may be expected to be 
more binding in Germany. Furthermore, these three banking groups expectedly manage capital 
differently because of their varying institutional characteristics. We deliberately differentiate 
between these three “pillars” of the German banking system in order to analyse the banks’ 
determinants of capital dependent on these very special institutional characteristics.  
The first “pillar” of the German banking system comprises the German savings banks, which 
are the only savings banks within Europe that are still publicly owned. Savings banks in other 
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European countries have been privatised many years ago. Communities and districts are the 
responsible bodies of German savings banks. Unlike joint-stock-companies, councillors elect 
most members of the supervisory board (Verwaltungsrat), which supervise the savings bank’s 
managers. Due to their specific public mandate, German savings banks have to offer financial 
services for the whole region in which they operate, and are not allowed to expand their business 
in other regions in order to avoid competition with savings banks in their neighbourhood. Further 
restrictions pertain to their investments. Often savings banks are not free to invest in private 
companies, but have to ask the relevant regulatory authority for permission, which monitors the 
additional regulations of public savings banks. As a consequence, savings banks may have a 
weakly diversified portfolio. Due to their special legal form, savings banks are not able to issue 
new shares on the capital market and have very limited access to the capital market. As a 
consequence, they heavily rely on increasing capital internally by accumulating profits. Their 
only alternatives to obtain external capital are to issue subordinate debt, some other hybrid 
capital (Genussrechtskapital) or to receive non-participating capital contributions (stille 
Vermögenseinlagen). In order to compensate for the public mandate, savings banks are granted 
public debt guarantees until July 2005 (Gewährträgerhaftung and Anstaltslast), which 
supplement the potent German deposit insurance system and completely prevent all savings 
banks from becoming insolvent. 
Cooperative banks make up the second “pillar”. Similar to savings banks, their business is 
restricted to the local region in which they operate to avoid competition with other cooperative 
banks. However, in contrast to savings banks, cooperative banks belong to their cooperative 
members. As these banks can receive fresh capital by winning new partners who have to pay in a 
certain amount of capital to join the cooperative bank, they may rely on accumulating profits to a 
lesser extent. In this regard, accumulating profits may be less important than attracting new 
members, which means paying high dividends.  
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The third “pillar” comprises other banks. On the one hand, this group consists of private 
commercial banks, i.e., big banks, branches of foreign banks and (private) regional banks and 
other commercial banks. On the other hand, this group comprises special banks, i.e., mortgage 
banks, building societies and banks with special functions (Banken mit Sonderaufgaben). Here, 
we also include Land banks (Landesbanken) and regional institutions of credit cooperatives in 
this category as their business is quite distinct from that of the savings and cooperative banking 
groups. Banks within this group titled other banks have easier access to the capital market than 
savings and cooperative banks, because many of them are joint-stock companies, which can 
easily raise external equity capital on the financial market. As argued by Dahl and Shrieves 
(1990), the magnitude of equity infusions makes them an important instrument to increase the 
bank capital ratio. Those banks in other legal forms are often subsidies of larger financial 
institutions and may easily obtain additional equity capital from their parent company. A further 
difference is the fact that these banks are allowed to operate nationally or even internationally, 
and are therefore not restricted to a certain local region. As a consequence, their credit portfolios 
may be more broadly diversified. 
The different organisational structure of these banking groups may be responsible for 
different behaviour regarding the determination of their capital ratio, even though all German 
banking groups are subject to the same regulatory capital requirements and are supervised by the 
same regulatory agencies. A bank that can easily raise capital externally for instance, may be less 
willing to increase capital than savings banks when approaching the minimum ratio of regulatory 
capital. On the other hand, a savings bank approaching the regulatory minimum may be willing 
to increase capital, but might not be able to do so. Therefore, it is worth analysing these different 
banking groups in detail. 
Indeed, we find remarkable differences between the behaviour of the banking groups. Results 
suggest that savings and cooperative banks rely on retained earnings more than other banks. 
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Additionally, we find a less pronounced negative relationship between size and the target capital 
ratio with regards to savings banks as compared to other banks. This finding may be due to 
public debt guarantees for savings banks and large savings banks having fewer chances to 
diversify their credit portfolios than large other banks.  
Furthermore, we obtain evidence in favour of the buffer theory of bank capital. In the case of 
moderately capitalised banks we find a positive and significant impact of changes in portfolio 
risk on changes in the capital ratio. These banks try to maintain their regulatory capital ratio and 
thus increase capital when increasing portfolio risk. In the case of less capitalised banks we 
obtain a much smaller or even negative relationship between changes in portfolio risk and 
changes in the capital ratio. This finding suggests that these banks try to strengthen their 
regulatory capital buffer by both increasing capital and reducing portfolio risk. Indeed, we find 
some further evidence that less capitalised banks increase capital to a greater extent than better 
capitalised banks. Additionally, no significant impact of changes in portfolio risk on changes in 
the capital ratio is found for the whole group of other banks. Some of them hold such a high 
regulatory capital ratio that changes in portfolio risk cannot explain any changes in the capital 
ratio. However, if these highly capitalised other banks are excluded from the sample, we obtain a 
positive and significant effect for the remaining, moderately capitalised banks as well. Finally, 
we obtain evidence that especially savings and cooperative banks try to leave the zone of 
regulatory pressure by issuing subordinate debt or hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital). Further 
research confirms the interrelationship between capitalisation and issuance of Tier 2 capital. 
In contrast to earlier studies, bank deposits to customers and loan loss provisions, which may 
be major factors determining capital, are considered in this study as well. Finally, we apply a 
more appropriate econometric methodology. We estimate dynamic panel regressions using the 
generalised method of moments (GMM), which allows us to efficiently consider the endogeneity 
of explanatory variables.  
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The structure of this study is as follows. Section 2 presents some hypotheses to be examined. 
Furthermore, it gives an overview about potential determinants of bank capital. Section 3 
characterises the dataset and Section 4 introduces the empirical methodology and the final 
specification of the model. Section 5 presents the results regarding the determinants of bank 
capital. In Section 6 the subordinated debt issue is examined in detail and Section 7 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
According to the capital buffer theory, banks wish to hold a certain amount of excess 
regulatory capital above the regulatory minimum. The reasoning behind their aim to maintain a 
certain capital buffer are the explicit and implicit regulatory costs, which would be the result of 
falling very close to or below the regulatory minimum. Buser et al. (1981) and Milne and 
Whalley (2001) argue that implicit costs of regulation may arise because of regulatory 
interference, which reduces the charter value1 of the bank. Consequently, banks’ changes in 
portfolio risk and the capital ratio may be positively related, as they wish to maintain their 
regulatory capital ratio. Those banks that have left their target capital zone and have fallen close 
to the regulatory minimum may have an incentive to return to their capital buffer by increasing 
capital and decreasing risk. Therefore, we may find a negative relationship between changes in 
portfolio risk and the capital ratio for less capitalised banks. The buffer theory, however, is not 
relevant for banks having an extraordinary high capital ratio. These banks are not forced to 
manage capital dependent on portfolio risk, as they are far away from experiencing regulatory 
costs. Consequently, we expect no significant relationship between changes in portfolio risk and 
the capital ratio for these banks. 
 
1 The charter value of a bank is the present value of the bank’s prospective new investments. See, for example, 
Keeley (1990) or Acharya (1996) for the importance of the charter value for a bank. 
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Hypothesis 1A (H1A) and 1B (H1B): Changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio are 
positively (negatively) related for well (less) capitalised banks. 
Hypothesis 1C (H1C): Changes in portfolio risk and the capital ratio are unrelated in the 
case of very strongly capitalised banks for which the buffer theory should not hold. 
 
The banks‘ profitability determines the banks‘ ability to increase capital by accumulating 
profits. That is why a positive relationship between the banks’ profitability and the target capital 
ratio may be presumed. A positive relationship would also be consistent with the pecking-order 
theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), stressing the bank’s preference for internal funding due to 
lower costs. However, a positive relationship is not compellable. Varying yearly payout ratios or 
profit transfers to or from the parent companies may influence the result. Nevertheless, it is 
expected that the positive relationship holds at least for savings banks, as they have less 
alternatives to fund themselves. Furthermore, they do not have parent companies they must 
transfer profits to and usually do not pay out profits or if so, they have very low payout ratios.   
Hypothesis 2A (H2A): The higher the  profitability, the higher the banks’ target capital ratio.  
Hypothesis 2B (H2B): Profitability as a determinant of the target capital ratio is most 
important for savings banks.  
There are several reasons why larger banks may target a lower capital ratio. Larger banks may 
have easier access to the capital market and can raise external capital more easily due to lower 
transaction costs. Thus they may have greater financial flexibility and may need less excess 
regulatory capital than smaller banks. In addition, they are more likely to have a more diversified 
portfolio and thus need less excess capital from the bank manager’s point of view. According to 
Titman and Wessels (1988), fixed direct bankruptcy costs finally constitute a smaller portion of 
firm value when the firm is larger, lowering the importance of bankruptcy costs. All these 
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reasons may result in a negative relationship between banks’ size and their target capital ratio. 
This size effect, however, should be smaller for cooperative banks and particularly for savings 
banks. These banks are financially less flexible as they are not listed on the stock exchange and 
cannot issue new shares on the capital market if necessary. Instead they must rely on retained 
earnings or issue subordinate debt or other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital). Additionally, 
even large savings and cooperative banks may need a high capital ratio due to limited scale 
effects in the diversification of their credit portfolio, since their business is limited to a certain 
local area. In contrast to cooperative banks and other banks, bankruptcy costs may be less 
important even for small savings banks because of the public guarantees (Gewährträgerhaftung 
and Anstaltslast) granted to savings banks until July 2005, which completely prevent all savings 
banks from going bankrupt.  
Hypothesis 3A (H3A): The larger the bank, the lower the target capital ratio (size effect). 
Hypothesis 3B (H3B): The size effect is weaker for savings and cooperative banks. 
3 Data 
We examine German banks using a unique dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 It 
comprises yearly (end-of-December) balance sheet and profit and loss account information from 
almost all German banks (no building societies) reported to the Deutsche Bundesbank from 1992 
to 2001.3 In order to analyse the banks’ behaviour in detail, we divide the heterogenous sample 
 
2 We also used an alternative dataset, which is publicly available from Hoppenstedt, but which is unrepresentative, 
since it only comprises of a subsample of all German banks. Nevertheless, we obtained similar results.   
3 Some cooperative banks and other banks could not be taken into account because of data restrictions. 
Furtmermore, we excluded banks with six and less consecutive observations from the dataset, as we need a longer 
number of continuous observations of each bank to run dynamic panel regressions. 
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of all German banks into three subsamples. The first one comprises all German savings banks 
and the second subsample consists of nearly all German cooperative banks. The third group is 
denoted other banks. On the one hand, these other banks comprise commercial banks, i.e., big 
banks, branches of foreign banks and (private) regional banks and other commercial banks. On 
the other hand the group of other banks comprises mortgage banks, Land banks (Landesbanken), 
regional institutions of credit cooperatives, and banks with special functions (Banken mit 
Sonderaufgaben).4 
3.1 Bank capital 
Two different definitions of capital ratios are presented in this study to obtain a differentiated 
impression of how banks determine their target capital ratios. The first one is a simple capital 
ratio defined as equity capital over total assets (CAP1). Alternatively, the results do not change 
with the inclusion of the fund for general bank risks according to the definition of Tier 1 capital. 
The second definition (CAP2) refers to total regulatory capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2). It is defined as 
the ratio of paid-up equity capital including the fund for general bank risks, subordinate debt and 
other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital), which in total are divided by total assets.5  
3.2 Bank risk 
Banks’ portfolio risk (RISK) is measured by the ratio of risk-weighted on-balance-sheet assets 
over total assets.6 We use the risk weights suggested by the Basle Committee on Banking 
 
4 A more detailed analysis of other banks is not possible, as the dataset allows no further identification of each bank. 
5 As we do not have any information about hidden reserves or revaluation reserves, CAP2 is a little smaller than the 
actual sum of Tier 1 + Tier 2 over total assets (see Deutsche Bundesbank 2003). 
6 Other risk assets like off-balance-sheet engagements and derivatives as well as market risk could not be considered 
because of data restrictions. 
Regulation in 1988, which are still obligatory today. Within the Basle Accord framework the 
individual assets of a bank are weighted according to some broad risk classes. Recent literature 
has pointed to the fact that such a measure of portfolio risk is too rough to indicate the banks’ 
probability of default. However, in this case, we are less interested in an accurate measure of the 
probability of default, but rather wish to explain banking behaviour in a regulatory context. 
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4 Partial-adjustment-framework and specification 
Building on Shrieves and Dahl (1992), we assume that banks consciously aim at a certain 
target capital ratio (see Diamond et al. (2000) for the existence of an optimal bank capital ratio) 
and suggest that changes in the bank capital ratio result from discretionary adjustments towards 
the target capital ratio and factors exogenous to the bank:  
            (1) , ,
d
j t j t j tCAP CAP ε∆ = ∆ +
where is the observed change in the capital ratio for bank j in period t,  is the 
discretionary change, and is the exogenous random shock, e.g. an unanticipated economic 
shock. The discretionary changes in the capital ratio  are modelled within a partial 
adjustment framework. Institutional inertia, high costs of rapid change, or a lack of information 
may prevent banks from reaching their target capital ratio instantaneously. Peltzman (1970)  and 
Marcus (1983) were among the first to model the bank capital decision within a partial 
adjustment model. Consequently, we rewrite equation (1) as follows:  
,j tCAP∆ ,
d
j tCAP∆
j,tε
,
d
j tCAP∆
            (2) *, , , 1j t j t j t j tCAP CAP CAPα ε−⎡ ⎤∆ = − +⎣ ⎦
where  is the speed of adjustment, and  denotes the target capital ratio for bank j in 
period t, which is not directly observable. By adding lagged capital to both sides of the equation 
we obtain the following equation:   
α *,j tCAP
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, ,ε           (3) 
*
, , 1(1 )j t j t j t j tCAP CAP CAPα α−= − + +
4.1 Variables affecting target capital 
Since the target capital ratio  is not directly observable, some observable proxy 
variables have to be found. In the following, the explanatory variables are presented, which 
affect the target capital ratio and thus determine changes in capital.  
*
,j tCAP
Portfolio risk 
Changes in the capital ratio and portfolio risk are supposed to be interrelated due to banking 
regulation (see hypotheses H1A and H1B). Therefore, we included RISK in the capital 
equation. 
∆
Profitability 
Corresponding to hypothesis H2A, the target capital ratio may be influenced by banks’ 
profitability. Thus, we also inserted the return on assets (ROA) as a common measure of 
profitability in the equation.  
Bank deposits from non-bank customers 
Bank deposits from non-bank customers are a very attractive means to fund a bank, because 
of the relatively lower interest rates compared to those of bearer bonds or borrowing from banks. 
Banks, therefore, compete for these deposits. In accordance with Gupta and Walker (1975), an 
increasing level of bank deposits from non-bank customers may be a proxy for the banks’ 
competitiveness and positive earnings expectations in future years. In order to control the 
potential effects on the target capital ratio, we include the bank deposit ratio (BDR), defined as 
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the ratio of all liabilities to non-bank customers divided by total assets, in the capital equation. A 
negative effect of BDR on the target capital ratio implies that lower (higher) future profitability 
involves increased (lower) pressure to extend buffer capital. A positive effect, in contrast, 
suggests that banks with a higher BDR can increase capital from external sources more easily 
than other banks, because they are in a better competitive position and have higher earnings 
expectations.  
Provisions 
We consider new loan loss provisions over total assets (PROV) as a potential determinant of 
the target capital ratio, as this ratio may indicate the banks’ financial health. A negative impact 
of PROV on changes in capital could mean that banks in financial distress have more difficulties 
in increasing their capital ratio. In contrast, a positive effect could signal that banks voluntarily 
increase their capital to a greater extent in order to overcome their bad financial situation. 
Shrieves and Dahl (2003) argue that loan loss provisions do not have any effect on changes in 
capital, since they are offset by realised security gains. Savings banks, however, may have few 
possibilities to realise security gains, since their investments are restricted by law. 
Regulatory pressure 
A bank having a regulatory capital ratio close to the regulatory minimum may have an 
incentive to increase its regulatory capital ratio in order to prevent this ratio from falling below 
the regulatory minimum. Otherwise regulatory costs may arise. To capture this potential effect 
we include a dummy variable REG into the equation indicating the banks’ regulatory pressure.7 
 
7 We assume that REG indicates regulatory pressure, although we cannot exclude that it partly measures the banks’ 
own incentive to prevent bancruptcy costs. 
In accordance with Ediz et al. (1998) and Rime (2001) we assume that both the ratio of capital 
over risk-weighted assets (CRWA) and its volatility have to be considered when measuring 
regulatory pressure, as the probability of falling below the regulatory minimum increases with 
the volatility of the capital ratio. The dummy variable REG equals unity if the ratio of capital 
over risk-weighted assets is within one standard deviation of a certain threshold and zero 
otherwise. Here, we set the threshold at the 25 percentile of the least capitalised German banks.8 
In order to analyse potential interactions with RISK according to hypothesis H1B, we 
combined REG with RISK. 
∆
∆
Merger 
The German banking sector is characterised by many mergers and acquisitions in recent 
years, which could have a direct impact on the banks’ capital ratio. We control this effect by 
including the variable MERG into the capital equation. The dummy variable equals unity if a 
bank has taken over another bank in the same year and zero otherwise.9 If distress mergers 
among savings or cooperative banks dominated, we would expect a negative impact of the 
dummy variable on the target capital ratio. 
Size 
Corresponding to hypothesis H3A, size may have an influence on the target capital ratio. To 
capture size effects, the natural log of total assets (SIZE) is included in the capital equation.  
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8 We also experimented with other definitions of regulatory pressure, but obtained very similar results. 
9 The dummy variable MERG was kindly provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Regulatory and macroeconomic shocks 
Macroeconomic shocks must be taken into account, as changes in the volume or structure of 
loan demand can influence banks’ observed capital. Also changes in banking regulation may 
influence the dependent variable in a specific year. Therefore, time dummies are included in the 
capital equation as well.  
 
Considering these explanatory variables, the final specification of the capital equation is as 
follows:10 
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,
 , 0 , 1 1 , 2 , , 3
4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 1 8 ,
(1 ) ( * )j t j t j t j t j t j t
j t j t j t j t j t j t
CAP CAP RISK RISK REG ROA
BDR PROV SIZE REG MERG u
β α β β β
β β β β β
−
−
= + − + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + + + +
 (4) 
where ,j t j j tu ,µ ε= + with jµ ~ 2(0, )IID µσ  and ~ . We estimate the model with 
both definitions of capital over total assets (CAP1 and CAP2) as dependent variables.  
,j tε
2(0, )IID εσ
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Table 1 presents the means of the variables for each year of the reference period and 
differentiates between the three banking groups. On average, other banks have a higher capital 
ratio than savings and cooperative banks. Another noteworthy fact is the high share of 
subordinate debt over total assets (SDEBT) for savings banks. It seems that these banks 
                                                 
10 We include the lagged value of the dummy variable REG into our equation. Regulatory pressure in the previous 
year can lead the bank to increase the capital ratio in the next year. However, including the current dummy variable 
instead of the lagged dummy variable in the equation would lead to a potential problem of simultaneity: a bank 
under regulatory pressure in period t is unlikely to have increased its capital ratio above average in period t. 
compensate their lower equity capital ratio by issuing subordinate debt. We analyse this potential 
relationship in Section 6.  
4.2 Considering the panel structure 
In contrast to many previous studies, e.g. by Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro 
(1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) and Rime (2001), we explicitly consider the bank-specific 
effects iµ .11 In order to avoid the Nickell bias according to Nickell (1981), we estimate equation 
(4) in first differences and instrument the lagged dependent variable in first differences. Finally, 
we apply the generalised method of moments (GMM), which is argued to be most appropriate in 
the context of dynamic panel analysis by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). 
Banking regulation results in an interrelationship of capital and portfolio risk with the 
consequence that portfolio risk is an endogenous variable in the capital equation and has to be 
instrumented. Other explanatory variables may be endogenous as well. Berger (1995), for 
example, claims that profitability is affected by the capital ratio and McNichols and Wilson 
(1988), among others, argue that loan loss reserves are discretionarily set. We decided to 
instrument all explanatory variables because statistical tests also indicate that these variables are 
potentially endogenous.12 We checked the validity of the instruments used. Firstly, absence of 
second order autocorrelation in the residuals in first differences is a necessary condition for 
                                                 
11 We also estimated a simultanous equation model (including a second equation explaning RISK) with pooled 
data in line with prior research, and obtained similar results. Regression results from 2SLS and 3SLS confirm our 
main findings in this paper. 
∆
12 We had to regard MERG as exogenous, as we could not find suitable instruments for this dummy variable. 
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obtaining consistent estimates. Secondly, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions should 
indicate, that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals and thus are valid. 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that the conventional GMM 
model in first differences (GMM-DIF) may suffer from instruments, which are uncorrelated with 
the residuals, but are weakly correlated with the instrumented variable. As a consequence, poor 
estimation precision may result. They propose to use a system of instruments in first differences 
for equations in levels in addition to using instruments in levels for equations in first differences. 
GMM-SYS denotes this extended system of moments. Besides GMM-SYS, we also estimated 
GMM-DIF as a robustness check, as the Sargan test in the case of GMM-SYS does not always 
confirm the validity of the instruments. If the total sample of cooperative banks is examined, the 
Sargan test sheds some doubt on the validity of the instruments even in case of GMM-DIF. In 
order to find the validity of the set of instruments using the Sargan test, we gradually reduced the 
number of observed cooperative banks by ignoring the smaller ones. We found that the Sargan 
test just validates the instruments, when the subsample is limited to the largest 551 cooperative 
banks. Since the results of this subsample are very similar to those obtained from the sample of 
moderately capitalised cooperative banks, we interprete them in favour of the larger sample. 
All calculations were conducted with Stata 8.0 and the DPD software package for Ox (see 
Doornik et al. 2002). We use the two-step version of the GMM estimator to obtain the Sargan 
test statistics, as the one-step version of the Sargan test over-rejects the validity of the set of 
instruments in presence of heteroskedasticity. As recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
the coefficient estimates are based on the one-step version. 
5 Results 
Tables 2a and 2b show the GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS results for the dynamic model given 
by equation (4). Both methods provide similar results. On the one hand, we present the results 
for the three banking groups of savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks. On the other 
hand, we differentiate between both definitions of capital to reveal potential variations in the 
results.  
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (1 ) tend to be somewhat lower in the 
GMM-DIF regression than in the GMM-SYS regression because of the special characteristics of 
the estimators. In the case of all other banks, we even obtain an insignificant coefficient of the 
lagged dependent variable in the case of GMM-DIF. Nevertheless, results indicate that the speed 
of adjustment ( ) is comparatively slow for savings and cooperative banks, but higher for the 
group of other banks. These banks have some additional opportunities to manage their capital 
level by transfering capital from or to their parent companies, by absorbing capital from the 
financial market or by realising capital gains or losses on security transactions.  
α−
α
 
(Insert Table 2a about here) 
(Insert Table 2b about here) 
 
Contrary to previous US empirical literature, we do not find a significant relationship between 
the target capital ratio and changes in portfolio risk for all German banks, but for savings banks 
only. Nevertheless, the result is plausible. As other banks have much more excess capital on 
average than savings banks (see Table 1), they are less likely to be subject to regulatory 
constraints and may coordinate portfolio risk and capital unsystematically (see H1C). The 
finding is in line with the buffer theory claiming a positive relationship only for banks with a 
moderate capital buffer as banks having a capital ratio far away from the regulatory minimum 
need not care about regulatory costs. 
If we ignore atypical banks having a high Tier 1 capital ratio to risk-weighted assets of more 
than 20 percent, we find a positive relationship between changes in portfolio risk and the target 
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capital ratio even for the cooperative and other banks. This result remains robust to variations in 
the threshold. Accordingly, these moderately capitalised cooperative and other banks try to 
maintain their capital buffer by increasing both capital and portfolio risk, giving evidence in 
favour of H1A. 
The buffer theory claims that weakly capitalised banks have fallen out of the range of 
appropriate regulatory capital ratios by external factors and will try to rebuild their appropriate 
capital buffer by increasing their capital ratio and decreasing portfolio risk. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between changes in the capital ratio and portfolio risk is expected. Indeed, the 
coefficients of the interacted term , *j t j tREG RISK∆  indicates that the positive relationship is 
smaller or even turns negative for less capitalised banks (see H1B).  
Further differentiating the results for both dependent variables CAP1 and CAP2, respectively, 
provides more insights. We find mixed evidence for a deviant behaviour of less capitalised 
savings banks depending on the definition of the capital ratio. While even weakly capitalised 
savings banks seem to positively coordinate changes in CAP1 and portfolio risk, we observe a 
significant and negative relationship for these banks if CAP2 is considered. The reasoning 
behind this finding could be the fact, that savings banks can influence total capital easier than 
Tier 1 capital, e.g. by issuing subordinate debt. As a consequence, they could easily increase 
total capital while lowering portfolio risk. In the case of cooperative and other banks having a 
ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets of less than 20 percent, however, the positive 
coordination of Tier 1 capital and portfolio risk is already less pronounced or even negative for 
weaker capitalised banks. These results suggest that these banking groups can easily influence 
Tier 1 capital. 
Considering the results of GMM-SYS, the dummy variable REG indicating regulatory 
pressure gives further evidence that savings banks can coordinate CAP2 easier than CAP1. While 
the dummy variable is insignificant for the CAP1 capital equation of savings and cooperative 
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banks, it turns significant and positive in the case of CAP2. This fact, moreover, suggests that 
savings banks under regulatory pressure try to leave the zone of regulatory pressure by issuing 
subordinate debt or other hybrid capital (Genussrechtskapital). 
Profitability is of great importance for both savings and cooperative banks, giving some 
evidence in favour of hypothesis H2A. As expected, the relationship is weaker for the group of 
other banks (see H2B). We attribute this finding to the institutional characteristics of other 
banks. While savings banks and cooperative banks strongly rely on retained profits to increase 
capital, other banks may use alternative ways to increase capital. Only other banks can issue new 
shares on the capital market or obtain fresh capital from their parent company.  
BDR  is of great importance for the group of all other banks. The lower the share of deposits 
to customers in relation to total assets, the higher is the target capital ratio of these banks. 
However, we adhere this special effect to the large heterogeneity of the group of other banks. In 
fact, specialised banks serving a certain niche in the banking industry without a notworthy 
amount of deposits from customers often have very high capital ratios, while the competitive 
universal banks with a more pronounced deposit business usually have moderate capital ratios. 
Indeed, the strong negative relationship disappears if only moderately capitalised banks with a 
ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets less than 20 percent are considered and indicates 
little importance in regard to BDR for moderatly capitalised other banks. However, we find a 
significant and positive relationship between BDR and the target capital ratio for cooperative 
banks, which strongly fund themselves by accepting deposits from customers (see Table 1). The 
results indicate that cooperative banks, which are more competitive and have higher earnings 
expectations, are able to increase capital from external sources easier than other banks. 
Particularly cooperative banks must be competitive in order to attract new partners and thus 
increase capital.  
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Loan loss provisions (PROV) have a significant and positive effect on the target capital ratio. 
The worse the financial health of the bank, the higher is the bank’s target capital ratio. Especially 
savings banks and cooperative banks seem to realise the necessity to increase capital as a buffer 
against unexpected losses along with their raise of loan loss provisions. In that regard, savings 
and cooperative banks voluntarily increase capital in the face of financial distress, although they 
are not forced to do so by regulatory pressure.  
We find remarkable differences between the banking groups regarding the effect of size on 
the target capital ratio. In the case of savings banks the effect is positive, which means that larger 
savings banks have a higher target capital ratio. However, the size effect is negative for other 
banks. Insofar, we obtain evidence in favour of H3A and H3B. The negative relationship between 
size and the target capital ratio holds even for this banking group if those atypical banks with a 
ratio of Tier 1 capital over risk-weighted assets above 20 percent is neglected. Otherwise it could 
be argued that the size effect is just a consequence of the heterogeneity of this banking group: 
Large universal banks usually aim at lower capital ratios than smaller highly specialised banks 
operating in niches.  
Mergers among banks seem to have a small impact on changes in the capital ratio. Only in the 
case of cooperative banks and other banks we find some evidence that mergers positively 
influence the capital ratio. We find no evidence, however, that banks preferably merge with 
weakly capitalised banks.    
6 Subordinate debt issue 
Issuing subordinate debt may be of different relevance for the three banking groups to manage 
capital. As shown in Table 1, savings banks have issued subordinate debt to a larger extent than 
other banks in the reference period. Furthermore, Table 3a suggests that banks issuing 
subordinated debt have a lower capital ratio than non-issuing banks. Accordingly, we presume 
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that a lack of equity capital could have led mainly savings banks to increase their Tier 2 capital 
ratio by issuing subordinate debt. In order to analyse our presumption, we regress the ratio of 
subordinate debt over Tier 1 capital on , which denotes the lagged ratio of Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets.13 We chose the lagged capital ratio because of potential 
endogeneity problems. Two interaction terms are added: firstly lagged CRWA3 interacted with a 
dummy being unity for all savings banks (SB), and secondly, lagged CRWA3 interacted with a 
dummy being unity for all cooperative banks (CB). Table 3b shows the results. As expected, the 
results indicate that all banking groups use subordinate debt in order to supplement their capital 
ratio. This finding is consistent with Ito and Sasaki (1998) and Horiuchi and Shimizu (1998) for 
Japanese banks. However, the coefficients of the interaction terms for the cooperative and 
savings banks are significant and negative, especially for savings banks, which suggests that 
particularly savings banks were forced to increase their capital ratios by issuing subordinate debt. 
In this regard, the subordinated debt ratio may be an alternative indicator of regulatory pressure.  
1t−
(Insert Table 3a about here) 
(Insert Table 3b about here) 
7 Conclusions 
This study examines, how German banks determine their capital ratios. A unique dataset 
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank comprising yearly balance sheet and profit and loss 
account information from 1992 to 2001 for nearly all German banks is employed. We 
differentiate between savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks to consider the 
 
13 A fixed effects logit model explaining SDEBT=0 and SDEBT>0, respectively, is estimated as well and shows 
similar results. An alternative random effects tobit model is inappropriate here, as the Hausman test rejects the 
random effects assumption. 
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characteristics of these three pillars of the German banking sector, which are expected to effect 
banks’ capital management. We account for the panel structure of the dataset and apply the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) to estimate the banks’ dynamic adjustments of capital. 
We find evidence in favour of the capital buffer theory, which claims that moderately 
capitalised banks try to maintain their regulatory buffer capital because of potential regulatory 
costs. Indeed, changes in portfolio risk have a positive and significant effect on changes in the 
capital ratio for savings banks as regulation is likely to be binding for these moderately 
capitalised banks. If highly capitalised cooperative banks and other banks with a ratio of Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets of above 20 percent are disregarded, we obtain a positive and 
significant relationship between changes in the capital ratio and portfolio risk for these banking 
groups as well. The positive relationship diminishes or even turns negative in the case of less 
capitalised banks. According to the buffer theory these banks increase capital and decrease 
portfolio risk to rebuild their capital buffer. By differentiating between diverse capital 
definitions, we find some evidence that savings banks can manage total capital more easily than 
Tier 1 capital. It coincides with our result that savings banks in particular use subordinated debt 
as an instrument to increase low capital ratios.  
As expected, banks’ profitability has a positive and significant impact on the target capital 
ratio for savings banks and cooperative banks. These banks particularly depend on retained 
earnings, because they have fewer alternatives to increase their capital ratios than other banks. 
Accordingly, the effect is less pronounced for other banks. The relationship between the ratio of 
bank deposits from non-bank customers over total assets (BDR) and the target capital ratio is 
positive for cooperative banks but insignificant for the group of moderately capitalised other 
banks. The result indicates that cooperative banks with expected higher future earnings due to a 
higher bank deposit ratio can absorb capital from external sources more easily than other banks. 
For other banks this effect is insignificant, as their funding from non-bank customers is less 
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pronounced. Loan loss provisions as a signal of banks’ bad financial health positively influence 
the target capital ratio if savings and cooperative banks are considered. Insofar, these banks seem 
to increase their capital ratio voluntarily in the case of poor financial health, independent of 
regulatory pressure. Finally, size has a negative impact on the target capital ratio for other banks. 
For savings banks the size effect is insignificant, as some arguments in favour of a negative size 
effect only hold for other banks. 
These findings have some policy implications. The absence of the size effect for savings 
banks suggests that large savings banks cannot exploit scale effects in diversification due to 
investment restrictions and their business being restricted to the local area they operate in. 
Insofar, the recent efforts of savings banks to diversify their credit portfolio by utilising credit 
derivatives are justified. Since our findings confirm the relevance of the capital buffer theory, we 
obtain evidence that banking regulation is effective in Germany as well. Furthermore, as poorly 
capitalised savings banks in particular make use of subordinate debt to increase capital, the 
regulator’s restricted acknowledgement of Tier 2 capital up to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital gains 
in importance. 
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Table 1: Number of observations and means of variables by year and banking group
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 total sav. coop. other 
banks banks banks
observations 2,854 2,857 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,862 2,597 2,379 24,997
   sav. banks 578 578 578 578 578 578 578 561 535 5,142
   coop. banks 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 1,791 1,619 17,634
   other  banks 244 247 252 252 252 252 252 245 225 2,221
   CAP1t -0.0010 0.0015 0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 0.0012 0.0013 0.0028 0.0008 0.0010 0.0005 0.0012 0.0002
   CAP2t 0.0023 0.0032 0.0022 0.0015 0.0019 0.0012 0.0013 0.0028 0.0005 0.0019 0.0026 0.0017 0.0016
CAP1t 0.0443 0.0461 0.0471 0.0476 0.0488 0.0500 0.0513 0.0537 0.0535 0.0490 0.0385 0.0474 0.0869
CAP2t 0.0486 0.0522 0.0547 0.0562 0.0581 0.0594 0.0607 0.0633 0.0631 0.0572 0.0539 0.0529 0.0987
CRWA1t 0.0946 0.1016 0.1007 0.1074 0.1046 0.1191 0.1103 0.1243 0.1226 0.1091 0.0641 0.0750 0.4839
CRWA2t 0.1017 0.1122 0.1134 0.1217 0.1199 0.1344 0.1257 0.1398 0.1377 0.1225 0.0896 0.0834 0.5090
sd(CRWA1)t 0.0229 0.0232 0.0236 0.0236 0.0236 0.0236 0.0236 0.0243 0.0238 0.0236 0.0055 0.0085 0.1855
sd(CRWA2)t 0.0265 0.0268 0.0272 0.0272 0.0272 0.0272 0.0272 0.0279 0.0275 0.0272 0.0135 0.0108 0.1888
RISKt 0.6031 0.6106 0.6120 0.6155 0.6229 0.6320 0.6328 0.6497 0.6448 0.6242 0.6074 0.6424 0.5183
   RISKt -0.0106 0.0078 0.0018 0.0035 0.0074 0.0091 0.0007 0.0172 -0.0051 0.0036 0.0083 0.0026 0.0007
ROAt 0.0036 0.0034 0.0034 0.0031 0.0029 0.0028 0.0024 0.0027 0.0028 0.0030 0.0026 0.0028 0.0057
BDRt 0.7602 0.7410 0.7278 0.7206 0.7112 0.7046 0.6901 0.6729 0.6847 0.7135 0.6737 0.7678 0.3746
PROVt 0.0029 0.0053 0.0031 0.0032 0.0037 0.0032 0.0032 0.0046 0.0047 0.0038 0.0043 0.0037 0.0033
SIZEt 18.9098 19.0014 19.0816 19.1557 19.2131 19.2785 19.3320 19.4679 19.6010 19.2172 20.6170 18.6122 20.7800
MERGt 0.0396 0.0459 0.0273 0.0290 0.0283 0.0451 0.0601 0.0
T
743 0.0643 0.0453 0.0286 0.0536 0.0185
SDEB t 0.0027 0.0040 0.0053 0.0061 0.0066 0.0066 0.0066 0.0069 0.0070 0.0057 0.0140 0.0031 0.0076
∆
∆
∆
 
 
Table 2a: Dynamic GMM-regression for CAP1j,t
CAP1t-1 0.7372 *** 0.9687 *** 0.7297 *** 0.6978 *** 0.6907 *** 0.9422 *** 0.7240 *** 0.9210 *** -0.0132 0.3178 *** 0.5815 *** 0.8071 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.844) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
   RISKt 0.0231 *** 0.0193 ** 0.0202 -0.0118 0.0316 *** 0.0386 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0270 *** -0.0092 -0.0010 0.0621 *** 0.0600 ***
(0.002) (0.032) (0.184) (0.679) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.912) (0.991) (0.007) (0.007)
   RISKt*REGt -0.0071 -0.0011 -0.0503 -0.0019 * -0.0173 -0.0430 *** -0.0183 * -0.0244 * 0.0150 -0.0172 -0.0463 ** 0.0399
(0.447) (0.910) (0.375) (0.063) (0.113) (0.000) (0.096) (0.067) (0.888) (0.877) (0.050) (0.113)
ROAt 0.4471 *** 0.7458 *** -1.0780 -0.4955 0.2522 ** 0.6964 *** 0.4441 *** 0.6764 *** 0.4570 0.3592 -0.0546 0.0281
(0.000) (0.000) (0.287) (0.477) (0.026) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.258) (0.277) (0.562) (0.814)
BDRt 0.0003 0.0020 * -0.0882 -0.0156 -0.0027 0.0042 *** 0.0134 ** 0.0050 ** -0.1677 ** -0.1910 *** 0.0046 0.0030
(0.924) (0.090) (0.266) (0.344) (0.659) (0.001) (0.012) (0.026) (0.031) (0.001) (0.543) (0.524)
PROVt 0.1116 *** 0.1023 *** 0.2671 *** 0.1660 *** 0.1423 *** 0.1401 *** 0.1072 ** 0.1745 *** 0.1330 -0.3534 0.1461 0.0626
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.777) (0.483) (0.114) (0.565)
REGt-1 -0.0005 * -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0019 *** -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 * -0.0001 -0.0339 ** -0.0089 -0.0017 -0.0023
(0.055) (0.666) (0.757) (0.007) (0.438) (0.114) (0.086) (0.763) (0.022) (0.562) (0.445) (0.291)
SIZEt 0.0029 ** 0.0005 *** -0.0308 -0.0028 *** -0.0059 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0005 -0.0017 *** -0.1196 *** -0.0364 *** -0.0057 ** -0.0012 *
(0.019) (0.006) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.733) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.077)
MERGt -0.0005 0.0002 0.0072 0.0015 *** 0.0023 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0015 *** 0.0149 0.0234 ** 0.0003 0.0000
(0.268) (0.573) (0.106) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.144) (0.030) (0.899) (0.998)
Constant 0.0002 ** -0.0128 *** 0.0012 * 0.0809 *** 0.0009 *** 0.0094 ** -0.0002 0.0312 *** 0.0101 *** 0.8805 *** 0.0005 * 0.0346 *
(0.018) (0.002) (0.051) (0.000) (0.000) (0.043) (0.410) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.098) (0.055)
No. of obs. 3,986 4,568 13,570 15,602 13,529 15,556 3,662 4,213 1,717 1,969 1,118 1,281
No. of banks 578 578 2.032 2.032 2.027 2.027 551 551 252 252 163 163
Sargan test 0.425 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.035 0.104 0.110 0.601 0.998 1.000
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.799 0.880 0.013 0.585 0.360 0.497 0.832 0.760 0.380 0.949 0.371 0.304
All
Savings banks
GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
Other banksCooperative banks
GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-DIFGMM-SYS
Moderately capitalised
GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
Largest coop. banks
GMM-SYS
All Moderately capitalised
GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
All
GMM-DIF
∆
∆
 
Note: The dependent variable CAP1j,t is defined as the book value of equity capital over total assets. Time dummies are included in each regression but are not reported. GMM-DIF and GMM-
SYS refer to the GMM difference estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively. Accordingly, all variables are first-differenced. As 
recommended by Arellano and Bond (1991), one-step results are presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second 
order autocorrelation in the residuals. p-values are in parentheses. We report p-values on the basis of robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 2b: Dynamic GMM-regression for CAP2 j,t
CAP2t-1 0.5891 *** 0.9931 *** 0.7246 *** 0.7068 *** 0.3632 *** 0.9249 *** 0.6775 *** 0.9596 *** -0.0185 0.3394 *** 0.4774 *** 0.8195 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.786) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
   RISKt 0.0586 *** 0.0752 *** 0.0425 ** 0.0141 0.0502 *** 0.0303 0.0373 *** 0.0563 *** -0.0170 0.0244 0.0427 *** 0.0575 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.628) (0.000) (0.179) (0.000) (0.000) (0.800) (0.758) (0.008) (0.005)
   RISKt*REGt -0.0376 -0.0633 * -0.0665 -0.1055 ** -0.0374 -0.0383 -0.0531 *** -0.0681 *** 0.0022 -0.1114 -0.0392 -0.0575 *
(0.229) (0.064) (0.328) (0.021) (0.017) (0.335) (0.002) (0.001) (0.981) (0.236) (0.181) (0.059)
ROAt 0.7623 *** 0.5745 *** -0.8684 -0.6081 0.1530 0.5651 *** 0.6548 *** 0.6489 *** 0.5470 0.6109 * 0.0653 0.0995
(0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.464) (0.357) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.191) (0.085) (0.400) (0.302)
BDRt -0.0351 *** -0.0004 -0.1101 * -0.0236 * -0.0333 *** -0.0085 ** 0.0161 * -0.0026 -0.1323 * -0.1829 *** -0.0091 0.0031
(0.001) (0.753) (0.100) (0.096) (0.000) (0.022) (0.051) (0.119) (0.073) (0.002) (0.349) (0.593)
PROVt 0.2788 *** 0.1619 ** 0.3692 *** 0.2321 * 0.3593 *** 0.2665 *** 0.1472 ** 0.2873 ** 0.3495 0.0401 0.1935 ** 0.0157
(0.001) (0.023) (0.003) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036) (0.020) (0.410) (0.945) (0.046) (0.887)
REGt-1 -0.0039 *** 0.0042 *** 0.0006 -0.0020 ** -0.0023 *** 0.0003 -0.0009 0.0025 *** -0.0375 *** -0.0118 -0.0042 -0.0014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.273) (0.019) (0.002) (0.742) (0.118) (0.000) (0.005) (0.355) (0.245) (0.669)
SIZEt 0.0077 ** 0.0000 -0.0289 -0.0026 *** -0.0098 *** -0.0006 0.0081 *** -0.0001 -0.1310 *** -0.0342 *** -0.0096 *** -0.0011
(0.018) (0.611) (0.146) (0.000) (0.000) (0.198) (0.007) (0.558) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.139)
MERGt -0.0009 0.0007 0.0069 * 0.0011 0.0032 *** 0.0012 *** -0.0005 0.0008 *** 0.0268 ** 0.0282 ** 0.0023 0.0002
(0.363) (0.342) (0.058) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.425) (0.004) (0.026) (0.025) (0.403) (0.952)
Constant -0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0851 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0212 -0.0005 0.0045 0.0106 *** 0.8347 *** 0.0010 *** 0.0348 *
(0.591) (0.877) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.142) (0.185) (0.298) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.063)
No. of obs. 3,986 4,568 13,570 15,602 13,529 15,566 3,662 4,213 1,717 1,969 1,118 1,281
No. of banks 578 578 2,032 2,032 2,027 2,027 551 551 252 252 163 163
Sargan test 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.191 0.132 0.219 0.600 1.000 1.000
AR(1) test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000
AR(2) test 0.342 0.224 0.003 0.513 0.194 0.941 0.185 0.043 0.360 0.946 0.550 0.322
GMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-DIF GMM-SYSGMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-DIF GMM-SYSGMM-DIF GMM-SYS GMM-DIF GMM-SYS
Other banks
All All Moderately capitalised Largest coop. banks All Moderately capitalised
Savings banks Cooperative banks
∆
∆
 
 
 
Note: The dependent variable CAP2j,t is a proxy variable for total capital over total assets. Time dummies are included in each regression but are not reported. GMM-DIF and GMM-SYS refer to 
the GMM difference estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively. Accordingly, all variables are first-differenced. As recommended by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), one-step results are presented, whereas the Sargan test refers to the two-step estimation results. AR(1) and AR(2) are the tests of first and second order autocorrelation 
in the residuals. p-values are in parentheses. We report p-values on the basis of robust standard errors. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 3a: Medians of proxy Tier1 capital over risk weighted assets
                 (CRWA3) for banks without and with subordinate debt
subordinate debt=0 subordinate debt>0
obs. median obs. median
all banks 13,064 0.0774 11,933 0.0622
sav. banks 983 0.0736 4,159 0.0596
coop. banks 10,908 0.0763 6,726 0.0634
other banks 1,173 0.1454 1,048 0.0697
Table 3b: Subordinate debt issue by different banking groups
Coef. P-value
CRWA3t-1 -0.1598 0.00
SB*CRWA3t-1 -5.3580 0.00
CB*CRWA3t-1 -2.7940 0.00
Constant 0.4253 0.00
obs. (banks) 11,932 (1,587)
R2 within/betw./overall 0.12 / 0.05 / 0.02  
 
 
Note: These are fixed effects regression results of subordinate debt over proxy Tier 1 capital on CRWA3t-1. CRWA3t-1 denotes lagged proxy Tier 1 
capital over risk-weighted assets. We differentiated between savings banks (SB) and cooperative banks (CB) by interaction with CRWA3t-1. Time 
dummies are included, but not reported. Only banks with outstanding subordinate debt are taken into account. 
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